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This paper uses a simple model of labor supply extended to allow for home production to understand
the extent to which differences in taxes can account for differences in time allocations between the
US and Europe. Once home production is included, the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure is almost irrelevant in determining the response of market hours to higher taxes. But to
account for observed differences in leisure and time spent in home production, one requires a large
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and a small elasticity of substituion betwen
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The observation that hours of market work in several European countries is almost
30% less than in countries such as the US has generated a considerable amount
of research directed at uncovering the cause of this large diﬀerence. Motivated by
the work of Prescott (2004), one factor that has received considerable attention
is the large diﬀerences in the size of tax and transfer systems across countries.
Prescott argues that diﬀerences in taxes on labor income can account for virtually
all of the observed diﬀerences in hours of work across the countries that he studies.
Subsequent work by Ohanian et al (2007) for a larger set of countries reinforces
this conclusion. A key feature of these analyses is that the only way that one can
obtain suﬃciently large diﬀerences in hours of market work in response to observed
diﬀerences in tax rates is if individuals are suﬃciently willing to substitute leisure
for consumption.
Recent work on cross country diﬀerences in time use (see, e.g., Freeman and
Schettkat (2001, 2005), Ragan (2005), and Burda et al (2008)) has found that
on average, the countries in continental Europe with low levels of market work
have substantially higher levels of time spent in home production than the US.1
This suggests that a model that stresses three uses of time—market work, home
work and leisure— is likely to be more appropriate for understanding cross country
diﬀerences in market work. In general, a model with home production can lead to
lower levels of market work not only by having individuals substitute leisure for
1See also Davis and Henrekson (2004) for indirect evidence in support of this ﬁnding. They
ﬁnd that European countries with high labor taxes have much less employment in those activities
which have good nonmarket substitutes.
1market consumption, but also by having individuals substitute market goods for
time spent in home production. It follows that in such a model, the willingness of
individuals to substitute leisure for consumption may no longer play a key role.
The objective of the present paper is to present a simple analysis to illustrates
the importance of the two elasticities just mentioned. In particular, I consider
the canonical model of labor supply extended to include home production. I then
use this model to assess the implications of an increase in the size of a tax and
transfer program that levies a proportional tax on labor income and uses the
proceeds to fund a lump sum transfer. I calibrate the model to the US economy
making diﬀerent assumptions about the two key elasticities, and then examine
the implications of the model for time allocations in the US and another economy
that is the same in all respects except for a higher tax rate.
Several interesting ﬁndings emerge. Whereas in the model without home pro-
duction, the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption plays a
critical role in how much market hours drop in response to a tax increase, this
elasticity is almost irrelevant in the model with home production. In contrast, the
elasticity of substitution between market goods and time in the home production
function does play an important quantitative role. Values of this elasticity that
are consistent with empirical estimates imply that diﬀerences in tax and transfer
systems can explain diﬀerences in hours of work of 25% or more independently of
individuals’ willingness to substitute leisure for consumption.
I then ask under what conﬁgurations of elasticities the model can account for
not only the diﬀerences in market work between the US and Europe, but also
2the breakdown of the remaining time between leisure and home production. Here
I ﬁnd that if individuals are quite willing to substitute leisure for consumption,
and the elasticity of substitution between market goods and time in the home
production function is at the small end of the empirical estimates in the data, then
the model can produce outcomes that are consistent with the results from time
use studies. In short, although the model can produce large diﬀerences in hours of
market work without a large willingness to substitute leisure for consumption, this
elasticity needs to be quite large in order to be consistent with observed diﬀerences
in leisure and time spent in home production.
This work is related to many papers in the literature beyond those already
mentioned. The important role of home production in models of labor supply
was ﬁrst emphasized by Becker (1965), with other early contributions made by
Gronau (1977). Much later, Benhabib et al (1991) and Greenwood and Hercovitz
(1991) argued that explicit modeling of home production in aggregate models was
important to understand changes in aggregate economic variables. McGrattan
et al (1997) found that home production was important for understanding the
response of the US economy to ﬂuctuations in taxes. More recently, Rogerson
(2008) and McDaniel (2008) have both argued that home production is quanti-
tatively important in understanding the impact of higher tax rates on hours of
market work in continental Europe, but neither of them considered how diﬀerent
values of the two elasticities interact.2
2Ragan (2005), Olovsson (2005) and Rogerson (2007) have also argued that thinking about
home production is also critical to reconciling the eﬀects of tax and transfer systems in Scandi-
navia with those in continental Europe.
3An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 reviews some evidence on diﬀerences
i nm a r k e tw o r ka n dt a x e sb e t w e e nt h eU Sa n dc o n t i n e n t a lE u r o p e ,a n dt h e n
uses a canonical model of labor supply without home production to assess the
quantitative implications of higher tax rates. This analysis serves to highlight the
important role of the labor supply elasticity. Section 3 then develops the model
with home production and presents the quantitative ﬁndings. Section 4 concludes.
2. Market Work and Taxes Across Countries: Background
This section presents some data on hours of market work and labor tax rates
across countries. It then uses a benchmark model of labor supply to assess the
extent to which the observed diﬀerences in labor tax rates can account for the
diﬀerences in hours of work observed between countries such as the US on the
one hand, and those of continental Europe on the other hand. This analysis will
focus on the role of the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption
in determining whether the tax story can plausibly account for the bulk of the
diﬀerences between these countries.
2.1. Data on Hours Worked and Taxes
In this subsection I present data showing how hours of market work diﬀer among
OECD economies. Although the subsequent focus will be on the US and a subset
of countries from continental Europe, I think it is useful to see the distribution
of hours worked over a larger set of countries to better appreciate the context.
The measure of hours worked is the product of total employment and annual
4hours of work per person in employment. The employment data is taken from the
OECD Labor Statistics Database, and the hours data is taken from the Groningen
Growth and Development Center (GGDC). It is important to note that the hours
data are meant to include diﬀerences in vacation and statutory holidays, as well
as diﬀerences in workweek. Because countries have diﬀerent sizes, it is necessary
to normalize these measures of aggregate annual hours by some measure of pop-
ulation. I choose the size of the working age population, i.e., those aged 15-64,
though note that this normalization is not important for the patterns that we
focus on. To facilitate comparisons I report all values relative to the US. Table
One shows the resulting distribution of relative hours of work across countries.
Table One
Hours Worked Relative to the US in 2006
<. 8[ .8,.9) [.9,.95) ≥ .95
Belgium (.73) Austria (.81) Denmark (.93) Australia (.96)
France (.73) Norway (.81) Finland (.90) Canada (.98)
Germany (.73) Spain (.88) Greece (.90) Ireland (.98)
Italy (.70) Sweden (.91) Japan (1.02)
Netherlands (.77) Switzerland (.93) New Zealand (1.00)
UK (.90) Portugal (.96)
T h et a b l er e v e a l st h a tt h e r ea r ed r a m a t i cd i ﬀerences in hours of work across
countries, with the economies of continental Europe working more than 25% less
than their counterparts in the US. While these numbers are for one particular
year and have not been corrected at all to account for temporary changes due to
5business cycle ﬂuctuations, these diﬀerences do reﬂect persistent diﬀerences that
have been present for more than a decade. In what follows I will focus on the
countries that represent the larger diﬀerences in this table, speciﬁcally the US and
the economies of continental Europe.
A key question for researchers is to uncover the factors that account for these
large diﬀerences, and several recent papers have addressed this issue. One par-
ticular explanation, ﬁrst put forward by Prescott (2004), and that has received
considerable attention is that these large diﬀerences in hours of work are largely
accounted for by diﬀerences in tax rates on labor. McDaniel (2006) produces
series for eﬀective average tax rates on labor income using the methodology out-
lined by Prescott (2004), which represent taxes levied on labor income, payroll
and consumption for 15 OECD countries from the mid 1950s through the early
2000s. She ﬁnds that the eﬀective average labor tax in the highest hours worked
c o u n t r i e si sa r o u n d3 0 % ,w h i l et h es a m er a t ei sa r o u n d5 0 %i nt h el o w e s th o u r s
worked countries.3
2.2. A Benchmark Model
This section describes a standard one-sector representative agent framework that
will be used to assess the implications of a simple tax and transfer program on
hours of work. Although the model below can be cast as the steady state analysis
in a representative agent version of the standard growth model, for expositional
3Although there are some diﬀerences in details, McDaniel’s work extends the earlier estimates
of average tax rates across countries by Mendoza et al (1994). The two methods produce similar
diﬀerences for the period of overlap.
6purposes I will abstract from capital accumulation and therefore focus on a static
version of the model.4
There is a representative household with preferences deﬁned over consumption
(c) and leisure (1 − h) given by u(c,1 − h). The function u is assumed to have
the standard properties: it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in both
arguments, strictly concave in c and (1 − h) jointly. We also assume that c and
(1 − h) are both normal goods. The individual is endowed with one unit of time.
There is a production technology that uses labor to produce the single good. This
technology is assumed to be constant returns to scale, and we furthermore choose
units so that one unit of labor produces one unit of the consumption good. We
assume a government that levies a proportional tax τ on labor income and uses
the proceeds to ﬁnance a lump sum transfer T to households.
I solve for the competitive equilibrium for this economy. Normalize the price
of output to equal one. Given the linear technology, it follows that the wage rate
in equilibrium must also equal one. The optimization problem of the household
in equilibrium can then be written as:
maxu(c,1 − h) (2.1)
s.t. c =( 1− τ)h + T, c≥ 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1
This leads to a ﬁrst order condition:
4The results obtained here are virtually identical to those that would emerge from a steady-
state analysis in the standard growth model.
7(1 − τ)u1((1 − τ)h + T,1 − h)=u2((1 − τ)h + T,1 − h) (2.2)




=( 1− τ) (2.3)
This condition completely characterizes the equilibrium value of time devoted to
market work as a function of the tax rate τ.
One can show that an increase in τ leads to a decrease in h, given our assump-
tion of normality. This result is intuitive—the direct eﬀect of the tax increase on
hours of work consists of both a substitution and an income eﬀect, the former of
w h i c hi sn e g a t i v ea n dt h el a t t e ro fw h i c hi sp o s i t i v e .B u tt h ef a c tt h a tt a xr e v e n u e s
are used to fund a lump sum transfer induces an oﬀsetting income eﬀect, thereby
leaving only the substitution eﬀect. The next section examines the magnitude of
the negative eﬀect on hours.
2.3. Quantitative Assessment
Prescott (2004) can largely be reinterpreted as a quantitative assessment of the
extent to which the above framework with varying levels of τ can account for
diﬀerences in labor input in the US and several European countries, both in the
cross section and over time. Given that there are some slight diﬀerences in the
8exercises, I report results for the current model.5
Preferences are restricted to be of the form:




The ﬁrst order condition then becomes:
α(1 − τ)
h




(1 − h)γ =
α
1 − α
(1 − τ) (2.5)
To assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of these tax and spending policies on
time devoted to market work I calibrate the model to match features of the US
economy and then consider the implications for changes in tax rates holding all
of the preference parameters ﬁxed. Following McDaniel (2006), I take τ = .30 to
correspond to the US tax rate, and as is typical in this literature, I take h =1 /3
as the fraction of discretionary time devoted to market work. Given a value of
γ the value of τ and the target value for h can be used to infer a value of the
parameter α. There is considerable controversy over the appropriate value of γ in
this type of exercise. In a dynamic setting this parameter describes the willingness
5Prescott (2004) carries out his analysis in the context of the growth model without imposing
s t e a d ys t a t e ,a n da sar e s u l th o u r sw o r k e di na n yg i v e np e r i o dd e p e n db o t hu p o nc u r r e n t
conditions as well as expected future conditions. In his analysis the ratio of current consumption
to output enters into the analysis since it captures the inﬂuence of future factors. One issue is
that diﬀerences in c/y might be due to factors other than taxes on labor.
9of the household to intertemporally substitute leisure. Many studies using micro
data conclude that this willingness is very small for prime aged married males,
while other studies have found much larger values for married females.6 Rogerson
(2006) argues that existing evidence from micro data is likely to be of little use
in determining the relevant elasticity to study the consequences of changes in ag-
gregate tax rates. Speciﬁcally, in the micro data much of the variation in wages
is idiosyncratic. Given the need to coordinate working times across individuals,
one would not expect much response of individual hours to idiosyncratic wage
changes.7 More recently, Rogerson and Wallenius (2008) argue that the estimates
from panel data on prime aged males provide very little information about the ag-
gregate labor supply elasticity. Here I will not try to ascertain what the deﬁnitive
value of γ is for representative household model under consideration. Instead, I
will simply assess the eﬀect of diﬀerent values for γ on the model’s implications
regarding the importance of tax and transfer systems on diﬀerences in hours of
work.
Given that labor tax rates in continental Europe are around 50%,T a b l eT w o
shows the relative time devoted to market work associated with a tax rate of 50%
relative to that in the equilibrium of the calibrated model that has a tax rate of
30%.R e c a l lt h a tα is recalibrated for each value of γ.
6A recent paper by Imai and Keane (2004) incorporates learning by doing and ﬁnds a much
higher estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
7See also Prescott (2006) for a discussion of this issue.
10Table Two
Market Work For τ = .5 Relative to τ = .3
γ = .50 γ =1 .0 γ =2 .0 γ =5 .0 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
.76 .79 .84 .90 .94 .97
This table implies that if γ is less than or equal to 1, then the diﬀerences in
tax rates can plausibly account for the bulk of the diﬀerences in hours worked
between the US and continental Europe. On the other hand, if γ is ﬁve or higher,
then the diﬀerences in tax rate are not the dominant factor, though the eﬀects are
still sizeable. Note that the reductions for the γ =1 0case are only about 30%
as large as the changes for the γ =1case. Obviously the value of γ is signiﬁcant
in terms of assessing the quantitative signiﬁcance. Prescott (2004) concentrated
on the γ =1case in presenting his results. For future reference we note that the
percent changes in leisure are roughly half of the percent changes in market work,
since in the original equilibrium the time allocation is one third to market work
and two-thirds to leisure. So the diﬀerences in leisure range from 13% to a little
more than 1%, depending upon the value of γ.
It is also of interest to assess the welfare eﬀects associated with an increase in
taxes from 30% to 50%. It should be noted up front that in this model there is no
role for a tax and transfer scheme, so that these calculations simply serve to inform
us about the welfare consequences associated with the distortions created by these
programs, and do not attempt to quantify any beneﬁts that may be associated.
The welfare measure used is the percent increase in consumption required to leave
the representative household indiﬀerent between the two equilibrium allocations.
11Table Three presents the welfare results.
Table Three
Welfare Cost of Moving to τ = .5 From τ = .3
γ = .50 γ =1 .0 γ =2 .0 γ =5 .0 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
.11 .09 .07 .04 .02 .00
This table shows that when the increase in taxes leads to large decreases in
hours of work, they are also associated with a large welfare cost—in the range of
10% when measured in terms of consumption. Note that when γ is very large,
the tax and transfer scheme is eﬀectively non-distortionary since market work is
relatively unaﬀected, so the program is very close to a lump sum tax used to
ﬁnance an equal lump sum transfer, which clearly has no welfare eﬀects.
3. The Analysis With Home Production
The previous analysis has assumed that there are only two uses of time: market
work and leisure. The essence of home production theory is that it can be useful
to consider a third use of time, namely time spent in home production. A key
implication of this theory is that changes in taxes lead not only to a reallocation
of time from market work to leisure, but also a reallocation of time from market
work to home production. If this is true, then the large diﬀerences in taxes across
countries should imply that time spent in home production could be an important
margin of adjustment. In this section we review some evidence regarding this
margin of adjustment and reexamine the eﬀects of taxes in a model that allows
for home production.
123.1. Cross-Country Evidence on Home Production
Several recent studies oﬀer information about diﬀerences in home and market
work between the US and European countries based on time use studies. A
common ﬁnding is that diﬀerences in market work are indeed signiﬁcantly oﬀset
by diﬀerences in homework. Freeman and Schettkat (2005) report that as of
the early 1990s, time spent in home production in European countries is about
20% larger than in the US. In an earlier paper that focused only on married
couples in Germany, Freeman and Schettkat (2001) found that total working time
was roughly the same in the two economies, with the only diﬀerence being the
allocation of these hours between home and market work. This study also shows
that the pattern of consumer expenditure diﬀers in a corresponding fashion, i.e.,
Germans spend more time on meal preparation at home and spend less money at
eating establishments. Using data from the recent Harmonized Time Use Study,
Ragan (2005) compares several European countries with the US and ﬁnds that
the European countries studied here have between 15% and 20% more homework
than do Americans.8
In a third study of time use data, Burda et al (2008) reach a similar conclusion
based on information for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US. In partic-
ular, they ﬁnd that Europeans engage in 15−20% more time in home production
than do Americans.9 This study also reports diﬀerences in leisure time of around
8Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) present data from another source which challenges this
conclusion. As noted by these authors, however, their data set seems ill-suited to cross-country
comparisons. The Harmonized Time Use data set used by Ragan was designed to speciﬁcally
address the shortcominings mentioned by Alesina et al, and hence seems more reliable.
9In comparing countries using the 2003 data it is important to be aware of changes in survey
1315%, though there are some diﬀerences across countries. Similar to the ﬁnding of
Freeman and Schettkat, Burda et al ﬁnd that leisure time in Germany and the
US is basically the same, though individuals in the Netherlands and Italy have
substantially more leisure than do Americans.
Related work has also been carried out by Davis and Henrekson (2004). Con-
sistent with the economic mechanism mentioned earlier, they show that countries
with higher marginal tax rates systematically have lower employment in those
market activities for which there are good nonmarket substitutes.
There are many issues associated with comparing the results of time use sur-
veys across countries. (See Burda et al (2008) for an extensive discussion of this
point.) Nonetheless, I interpret the above evidence as showing that the lower time
devoted to market work in continental Europe is associated both with an increase
in leisure and an increase in time devoted to home production. Moreover, though
there is some variation across countries, with Germany being somewhat of an out-
lier, the increases in these two dimensions of time allocation are each in the range
of 15 − 20%.
3.2. A Model With Home Production
In this section we extend the earlier model to allow for home production. Specif-
ically, following Becker (1965) we now assume that there is a home production
function that uses goods (g)a n dt i m e( hn) as inputs to produce total consumption
design in the US. Relative to earlier surveys in the US, the American Time Use Survey, initiated
as part of the CPS, tends to generate larger amounts of time reported to child care. In the US




This function is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing
in each argument, concave in the two arguments jointly and strictly concave in
each argument, and in addition displays constant returns to scale. Following
Gronau (1977), preferences are now written as:
u(c,1 − hm − hn)
where c is total consumption, hm is time devoted to market work, and hn is time
devoted to home production. The function u is assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. As be-
fore, there is an aggregate production function that uses market hours to produce
the single good, and as before we normalize units so that one unit of market time
yields one unit of the market good. The government is modeled exactly as before:
it levies a constant proportional tax on market wages and uses the proceeds to
fund a lump sum transfer. We again solve for the competitive equilibrium, and
as before we assume without loss of generality that the price of consumption and
the market wage are normalized to one.
The consumer’s problem in equilibrium can then be written as:
max
c,hm,hn
u(c,1 − hm − hn)
15s.t. g =( 1 − τ)hm + T
c = f(c,hn)
hm ≥ 0,h n ≥ 0,h m + hn ≤ 1
Substituting the budget equation and the home production function into the ob-
jective function, and assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions for
market work and time spent in home production are:
(1 − τ)u1 (f((1 − τ)hm + T,hn),1 − hm − hn)f1((1 − τ)hm + T,hn)
= u2 (f((1 − τ)hm + T,hn),1 − hm − hn)
u2 ((1 − τ)hm + T,hn,1 − hm − hn)f2((1 − τ)hm + T,hn)
= u2 (f((1 − τ)hm + T,hn),1 − hm − hn)
The interpretation of these two conditions is standard. They together imply that
the marginal value of time allocated across the three activities—market work, home
work and leisure—are equated. The ﬁrst requires that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between leisure and market consumption is equal to the after tax wage
rate, while the second requires that the marginal rate of substitution between
home production time and leisure be equal to unity. As before, the government
budget constraint implies that in equilibrium, T = hmτ, so that these two ﬁrst
16order conditions can be written as:
(1 − τ)u1 (f(hm,h n),1 − hm − hn)f1(hm,h n)=u2 (hm,h n,1 − hm − hn)
u1 (hm,h n,1 − hm − hn)f2(hm,h n)=u2 (hm,h n,1 − hm − hn)
Manipulating these two equations, and suppressing arguments of the functions,
one can obtain the following two equations:
(1 − τ)=f2/f1
u2/u1 = f2
Note that only the ﬁrst of these two equations contains the tax rate τ.M o r e o v e r ,
given that the function f satisﬁes constant returns to scale, the ﬁrst equation de-
termines the ratio hm/hn as a function of the tax rate, and this ratio is decreasing
in τ. That is, the greater the tax rate, the less is the ratio of market to home
work. The second equation is independent of the tax rate and therefore depicts
a stable relationship in hm − hn space. If this relationship is downward sloping,
then it follows that an increase in τ leads to a decrease in hm a n da ni n c r e a s ei n
hn.
3.3. Quantitative Results
In this section we consider the quantitative implications of a change in the size of
the tax and transfer program in the model with home production. We adopt the
17following functional forms:
u(c,1 − hm − hn)=αlogc +( 1− α)








The utility function is of the same form as the one used in the model studied
earlier that did not include home production. In particular, this function imposes
oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects, and the parameter γ determines the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The choice of home
production function is standard in the literature. The parameter η determines
the extent of substitutability between goods and time in producing consumption,
and will play a key role in determining how market hours respond to a change in
the scale of the tax and transfer program.
We adopt a similar calibration procedure to that used previously. In particular,
we assume a tax rate of .3 in the US, and pick values for the two elasticity
parameters γ and η. Having picked these values, we then calibrate the parameters
α and αm so that the equilibrium has hm =1 /3 and hn =1 /4.T h i sr a t i oo ft i m e
devoted to market work and home production is consistent with the averages for
the US over the recent past, as presented by Francis and Ramey (2007) and Aguiar
and Hurst (2007).
As before, we consider values of γ equal to .5, 1, 2, 5, 10,a n d20.F o r η
we consider values of 0, .4, .5,a n d.6. I noted earlier that there is considerable
controversy regarding the appropriate value of γ to be used in a model such as
18this one. In contrast, the estimates of η in the literature all lie within the range
of .4 − .6. Using aggregate data, McGrattan et al (1997) ﬁnd a value of η in the
range of .40 − .45, while Chang and Schorfheide (2002) ﬁnd a value in the range
of .55 − .60. Using micro data, Rupert et al (1995) ﬁnd an estimate in the range
.40 − .45, while Aguiar and Hurst (2008) report an estimate for their benchmark
speciﬁcation in the range of .50 − .60. I include the value of η =0s i n c ew ek n o w
from the work of Benhabib et al (1991) that when γ =1and η =0the presence of
home production has no impact on the behavior of market hours, thereby making
it an interesting benchmark.
For the model without home production studied earlier, the implications are
completely summarized by examining the change in market work, since this also
allows one to deduce the change in leisure. In the model with home production
there is no longer a one-to-one mapping between changes in hours of market work
and changes in leisure. The next three tables display how the relative values of
market work, home work and leisure respond to an increase in taxes from .3 to .5
for the various combinations of the two elasticity parameters.
Table Four
Market Hours for τ = .5 Relative to τ = .3
γ = .5 γ =1 γ =2 γ =5 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
η =0 .76 .79 .81 .83 .84 .85
η = .4 .69 .71 .73 .74 .75 .75
η = .5 .66 .67 .68 .70 .70 .70
η = .6 .60 .61 .62 .63 .63 .64
19Table Five
Home Hours for τ = .5 Relative to τ = .3
γ = .5 γ =1 γ =2 γ =5 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
η =0 1 .07 1.10 1.14 1.17 1.18 1.19
η = .41 .21 1.25 1.27 1.30 1.31 1.32
η = .51 .28 1.32 1.34 1.37 1.38 1.38
η = .61 .40 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.47
Table Six
Leisure for τ = .5 Relative to τ = .3
γ = .5 γ =1 γ =2 γ =5 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
η =0 1 .14 1.10 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.01
η = .41 .11 1.08 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.01
η = .51 .10 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01
η = .61 .07 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01
W h i l et h ea b o v et a b l e sp r e s e n taw e a l t ho fi n f o r m a t i o n ,Iw o u l dl i k et of o c u s
on a few simple points. First, as one would expect, as one increases the elasticity
of substitution between time and goods in the home production function, (i.e.,
increases η), holding γ ﬁxed, one gets larger eﬀects on market hours from the 20%
increase in tax rates. This is because there is a larger increase in time devoted
to home production. Somewhat surprisingly, the increase in η is also associated
with a decrease in the eﬀect of τ on leisure time. Intuitively, the presence of home
production provides an alternative way to reallocate the time associated with a
reduction in market work, and therefore leisure time responds less. It follows









































Figure 1: The Eﬀect of γ on the Response in Hours
that if one only looks at the eﬀe c to ft h et a xi n c r e a s eo nm a r k e tw o r k ,i ti sn o w
relatively easy to obtain decreases that are 30% or greater. When η = .5,t h e
decrease in market hours is 30% even for values of γ that are as large as 10 or 20.
A closer look at Table Four reveals another interesting pattern. Speciﬁcally,
the sensitivity of the reduction in hours to changes in the value of γ are much
less than in the model without home production. This is true even if η =0 .T o
see this, Figure 1 plots curves showing the relative hours of market work as a
function of gamma for both the model without home production as well as the
home production models for several values of η.
The solid line in this ﬁgure plots the results displayed in Table One. The other
three lines plot the results from Table Four, for the cases of η =0 , .4,a n d.6.A s
21noted earlier, when η =0and γ =1 , the model with home production and the
model without home production have identical implications for market work, and
the ﬁgure indicates this result. However, what is striking is that all of the curves
from the model with home production are virtually ﬂat compared to the curve
for the model without home production. The eﬀect of changes in the elasticity
between time and goods in the home production function is eﬀectively to shift the
curve downward in a parallel manner.
The key ﬁnding from the above analysis is that once one considers an explicit
model of home production, the value of γ plays very little role in inﬂuencing the
eﬀect of increases in taxes on the amount of time devoted to market work. This
is in sharp contrast to the model that did not contain home production. There
we found that the decrease in market work was hugely aﬀected by the value of
γ with the result changing by almost an order of magnitude as we moved from
γ = .5 to γ =2 0 .
Next we consider the extent to which there are parameter values for which
the model can mimic the diﬀerences along all three dimensions of time allocation.
Recall that based on time use data, the diﬀerences between the US and continental
Europe are in the range of 10 − 20% for both dimensions, and the diﬀerences
in market hours is in the range of 25-30%, though we note that Germany was
somewhat of an outlier since the diﬀerence in leisure was close to zero. Looking
to Table Three, it is clear that there are many combinations of parameters that
yield a drop in market work of the order of 25 − 30%. Note that this rules out
the combination of η =0and values of γ that are 1 or above, since these do no
22produce a suﬃcient drop in hours, as well as value of η = .6, since it produces
too large of a decrease. Next we consider which of these generate changes in both
leisure and home production in the 10 − 20% range. Interestingly, almost none
of the combinations lie in this range. Typically the change in leisure is too small
r e l a t i v et ot h ed a t aa n dt h ec h a n g ei nh o m ep r o d u c t i o nt i m ei st o ol a r g er e l a t i v e
to the data. Values of η that lie in the range of previous estimates, i.e., in the
range of .4 to .6,t e n dt op r o d u c ec h a n g e si nh o m ep r o d u c t i o nt h a ta r et o ol a r g e
relative to what is found in the data, though for η = .4 and smaller values of γ
the diﬀerence in home production time is less than 25%.A l s on o t et h a ti no r d e r
to generate diﬀerences in leisure that are close to those noted in time use surveys
it is necessary to have a fairly low value of γ.
In doing these comparisons it is important to keep in mind the qualiﬁcations
noted earlier regarding the issues involved in comparing time use survey data
across countries. Nonetheless, we think that this exercise is informative as a
crude test to see if a standard home production model with taxes can account not
only for the diﬀerences in market time but also for how this time is reallocated
toward leisure and home production. I would summarize the ﬁndings of the above
exercise to be that this is possible as long as γ and η are relatively small. It is
therefore interesting to note that although a model with home production does
n o tr e q u i r eas m a l lv a l u eo fγ in order to generate large diﬀerences in hours of
market work, it does require a relatively small value of γ in order to get substantial
diﬀerences in leisure.
Lastly, it is of interest to ask how the welfare comparisons are aﬀected by the
23introduction of home production. As before, we compute the amount of market
consumption that individuals in the τ = .3 economy would be willing to give up
in order to make them indiﬀerent to living in the τ = .5 economy. We note that
the compensation is only in terms of market goods, and not overall consumption.
T h er e s u l t sa r ei nT a b l eS e v e n .
Table Seven
Welfare Cost of Moving to τ = .5 From τ = .3
γ = .5 γ =1 γ =2 γ =5 γ =1 0 γ =2 0
η =0 .10 .09 .08 .07 .07 .07
η = .4 .13 .13 .12 .11 .11 .11
η = .5 .15 .14 .14 .13 .13 .13
η = .6 .17 .17 .16 .16 .16 .16
Note that for γ =1and η =0t h ew e l f a r er e s u l ti st h es a m ea si nt h em o d e l
without home production. The table shows that welfare costs are increasing in
the value of η, just as the decrease in market hours is increasing in η. While it
is true that with a higher value of η individuals are more willing to substitute
between these two factors, it remains true that the welfare cost of the distortion is
increasing. In order to obtain a negligible eﬀe c tw ew o u l dn e e dn o to n l yt h a tγ is
large but also that η is a very large negative number. This would lead to very little
change in the time allocation along all margins, and thereby eﬀectively turn the
tax and transfer program into a lump sum tax used to fund a lump sum transfer.
Note also that whereas in the model without home production we found that the
welfare eﬀects were negligible for large values of γ, this is no longer the case here.
24The reason for this is that even when γ is very large, the tax and transfer scheme
still has a large distortion on allocations, by changing the mix of goods and time
used in the home production function.
4. Conclusion
This paper has used a simple model of labor supply extended to include home
production to understand how two key elasticities inﬂuence the response of time
allocation to increases in tax rates. Three key results emerged. First, once home
production is incorporated, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure becomes almost irrelevant in determining the response in time devoted to
market work to an increase in taxes. This is in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings
in a model that does not include home production. Second, the elasticity of
s u b s t i t u t i o nb e t w e e ng o o d sa n dt i m ei nt h eh o m ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o na r ea n
i m p o r t a n td e t e r m i n a n to ft h er e s p o n s ei nt i m ed e v o t e dt om a r k e tw o r kt oa n
increase in taxes. Third, in order to match both the observed diﬀerences in time
allocation along all three dimensions—market work, home work and leisure—one
needs a fairly large elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
as well as not too large of an elasticity between time and goods in the home
production function. There may be some tension between the observed diﬀerences
in time allocations across countries and the estimates of the elasticity between time
and goods from previous empirical work. Improvements in measurement that will
allow us to better compare time use studies across countries will be important in
making further progress in this area.
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